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Over the last ten years, the practice of 
conducting performance evaluations 
of boards of directors has become 
commonplace in large corporations. 
Not only is the process widely 
established but it is seen as an 
essential tool in achieving better 
board performance and effectiveness.
 
Despite this, investigations into the 
causes of the global fi nancial crisis have 
concluded that poor board oversight 
was a contributing factor in the collapse 
of many fi nancial fi rms. Post-crisis, the 
regulatory spotlight has fallen, not for the 
fi rst time, on boards of directors: their 
composition, skills and dynamics. As this 
article will discuss, although signifi cant 
regulatory change in this area is unlikely in 
Australia, international developments will 
infl uence board evaluation practices in this 
country and the commitment and rigour 
surrounding board evaluation is only likely 
to increase.
Empirical fi ndings
This article draws on the fi ndings of 
our recent research aimed at capturing 
the state of play of board and director 
evaluation processes in Australia and 
overseas.1 The research is highly relevant 
post-GFC, as it explores how board 
evaluation can improve board performance 
and effectiveness and how this value 
can best be communicated to investors. 
Organisations across the world have been 
examining the causes of the fi nancial 
crisis, including the corporate governance 
failures that contributed to its severity. The 
emerging conclusion is that in the area of 
corporate governance four overlapping 
problems had arisen, particularly in 
fi nancial fi rms.
1. Risks were complex and poorly 
managed.
2. Executive compensation schemes 
encouraged excessive risk-taking.
3. Boards were not exercising proper 
oversight.
4. Shareholders were not monitoring or 
engaging with companies effectively.2
It is the third issue that we focus on in 
this article: the role of a board, how 
boards can improve their performance 
and recent developments in the process of 
board evaluation. As well as the fi ndings 
of our recent research conducted in 
conjunction with the Australian Council 
of Superannuation Investors, we examine 
the recommendations arising out of some 
of the many international investigations 
into the GFC. Although these reports deal 
mostly with the large fi nancial fi rms at 
the heart of the crisis, their fi ndings and 
the consequential regulatory changes are 
already spreading to encompass listed 
companies across all industry sectors. 
We discuss the three main aspects of 
board performance and its evaluation: 
fi rst, what makes a good board, second, 
how boards should be evaluated and third, 
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Board performance 
evaluation post-fi nancial 
crisis
• A culture of mutual respect 
and transparancy is most 
conducive to healthy and 
challenging boards
• The crucial ingredient is the 
quality of human interaction 
which is hard for outsiders, 
especially investors, to know 
and measure
• In a good board, evaluation 
takes place continuously 
rather than waiting for 
formal annual reviews
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the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 
Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations.4  The Australian 
Institute of Company Directors has 
introduced a mentoring scheme for 
female executives, seen as a very positive 
development by most directors. In 
addition, the Business Council of Australia 
has been active and provided a submission 
on the topic to the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council.5 
Our interviews confi rmed the role of the 
chairman as pivotal in creating an effective 
board. Most directors saw the chairman 
as the leader who sets the agenda and 
the culture of the board. An effective 
chairman, who can maintain a constructive 
relationship with the CEO, is seen as a 
tremendous asset to the company.
You certainly need a good chair 
who encourages debate and draws 
out contributions from each of the 
members and doesn’t allow the 
loudest voice to dominate. A chair 
who drives decisions to a consensus 
or makes decisions that the board will 
support. 
Other factors contributing to an effective 
board include the infrastructure in place 
such as having good management 
information systems or having the ‘right’ 
number of committees and length of 
board papers. 
Not surprisingly, a dysfunctional board 
culture is characterised by the direct 
opposites of a functional, collegial board 
culture. A board culture that does not 
allow transparent, open communication 
or that creates an adversarial environment 
can severely hinder board performance. 
Dysfunction in the board. You will 
know of cases in recent times. It 
becomes public and it directly affects 
the leadership of the company in 
many ways, not just ‘do we know 
who the boss is?’ It tears at the 
heart of the company and leads 
to poor performance. A chair of a 
dysfunctional board has a lot to do 
to fi x it up. If there is a dysfunctional 
director, the chair has to act. It is not 
an easy thing, it is not just ‘come and 
have a cup of tea’. A reshaping of the 
board can take up to three years. It 
can take an average of 18 months, if 
someone digs their heels in.
Directors interviewed had a clear idea of 
the elements that contribute to effi cient 
and effective board performance, and 
the elements of board behavior that lead 
to dysfunctionality. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the key characteristics of 
effective versus dysfunctional boards.
In the UK, many of these characteristics 
were picked up by the ‘Review of corporate 
governance in UK banks and other fi nancial 
industry entities’ (the Walker review)  and 
the Financial Reporting Council’s concurrent 
review of the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance.7 The fi nal recommendations 
of the Walker Review were released in 
November 2009 and included an entire 
chapter on the functioning of the board 
and evaluation of performance. In particular 
the review examined the role of non-
executive directors on the board, ultimately 
recommending that they be ‘ready, able and 
encouraged to challenge and test proposals 
on strategy put forward by the executive’.8  
As a result, a revised version of the UK 
Combined Code, now the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, was published in 
May 2010. Many of the changes to the 
Code were specifi cally directed towards 
improving board effectiveness and 
performance.
To encourage boards to be well 
balanced and avoid ‘group think’, there 
are new principles on the composition 
and selection of the board, including 
the need to appoint members on merit, 
against objective criteria, and with due 
regard for the benefi ts of diversity, 
including gender diversity.
To promote proper debate in the 
boardroom, there are new principles 
on the leadership of the chairman, 
how the results of such evaluation can 
best be communicated to investors.
Factors infl uencing board 
performance
Our research involved two stages: fi rst, an 
analysis of information on board evaluation 
published by a sample of companies 
worldwide; and second, interviews with 
Australian directors and investors which 
explored the value of board evaluation 
in more detail. The interviews allowed 
the researchers to explore the key factors 
necessary for a board to function effectively 
and, on the other hand, the factors that 
directors had found to most hinder good 
board performance. Comments from those 
interviews are presented here to illustrate 
the key points.
In order to operate effectively, directors 
valued an honest, transparent board culture 
conducive to ‘healthy, challenging’ debate. 
Mutual respect for each other was seen as vital 
in order to create an atmosphere within which 
the board could function effectively as a team. 
You have to have differences of view. 
You get through the differences of view 
and come out on the other side with 
agreement. On the big issues you want 
debate, even disagreement. You do 
not want acrimony, but you do want 
differences of opinion. 
A collegial board based on consensus 
decision-making was seen to be ideal, 
based on respect for colleagues and an 
appreciation of the diversity of thought 
and experience contributed by each 
individual. The ensuing frank dialogue in 
the boardroom was seen as vital for good 
board performance. The many comments 
on board diversity and its importance in 
effective board performance demonstrate 
the increasing awareness of this issue among 
directors. Since the CAMAC report in 2009,3  
this area has been under the spotlight.
For instance, CSA and Women on Boards 
jointly developed guidance to assist ASX-
listed entities comply with the changes to 
Table 1: Key traits of dysfunctional and effective boards
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Nevertheless, the expanded commentary 
on board diversity is relevant to succession 
planning and board performance in 
achieving diversity objectives. It makes it 
clear that nomination committees ought 
to consider the issue of diversity in their 
succession planning, regularly review 
the proportion of women employed 
at all levels of the company; and make 
recommendations to the board to address 
board diversity. 
the responsibility of the non-executive 
directors to provide constructive 
challenge, and the time commitment 
expected of all directors.9
In Australia, the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s guidelines were 
reviewed in 2009–2010 and amendments 
to the guidelines were announced on 
30 June 2010. The amendments were 
designed to take into account the 
fi ndings of three recent independent 
reviews which focused on issues related 
to corporate governance: CAMAC’s 
reports Diversity on Boards of Directors10  
and Aspects of Market Integrity11; and 
the Productivity Commission’s report 
Executive Remuneration in Australia.12  
Thus the amendments deal with diversity, 
remuneration, trading policies and investor 
briefi ngs and do not deal directly with 
board performance evaluation. 









Honesty, openness and transparency
Mutual trust and respect 
Consensus, common purpose






Dominated by the CEO
Experienced — manages the agenda
Encourages debate and contribution
Professional relationship with the CEO
Takes responsibility for effective board
Directors Lack of business experience or appropriate skills
Not genuinely independent
Factional interests or confl icts
Disruptive personalities
Egos that get in the way
Diversity (of thought, skills and experience)
Right fi t for company
Work as a team
Constructive challenge
Senior management Withholding information from the board
Lack of transparency
Lack of trust 
Effective communication with board
Ask questions and ‘use’ experience of board members
Processes No process to solicit views
No process in place to deal with confl ict or issues
Poor information fl ow
Poorly structured meetings and papers
Limited succession planning
Open discussion
Good information fl ow
Effective delegation to committees
Board agenda papers (right length and time)
Succession planning
   203
Without doubt, in future, boards or 
their nomination committees, are going 
to be expected to spend a considerable 
amount of time assessing their overall 
composition and skill set. Our research 
found that Australian boards were already 
doing this but that there was defi nitely 
room for improvement in the use of tools 
such as skills matrices. Although very 
useful, directors acknowledged that skills 
matrices can be ignored by a chair or CEO 
who has a strong view on a potential new 
board member. Equally, overreliance on 
a skills matrix could cause a company to 
overlook someone whose input might be 
extremely valuable but not fall within the 
relevant categories.
Different companies have different 
[requirements]. At one company the 
matrix includes the work experience 
of all the directors, overlaid with their 
knowledge. It’s really tricky as you 
want to throw other things in that 
make people valuable. You can tick a 
box (eg international experience) but 
it might not be in the area you want. 
We do that in terms of looking at 
potential members.
Evaluation of board performance
Our interviews revealed that board 
evaluation is well entrenched in large 
Australian companies and has become 
routine practice over the last decade. 
The earliest board evaluation mentioned 
by participants was in 1996 with most 
companies starting in the early 2000s. An 
important change noted by the directors 
is that they are more comfortable with 
board evaluation now than years ago 
when board evaluation was in its infancy. 
This has resulted in a greater willingness 
to engage in more robust and meaningul 
board evaluation, which is oriented 
towards positive outcomes. 
Another of the main changes to the UK’s 
Corporate Governance Code involved a 
strengthening of the recommendations 
surrounding board evaluation processes.
To help enhance the board’s 
performance and awareness of its 
strengths and weaknesses, the chairman 
should hold regular development 
reviews with each director and 
board evaluation reviews in FTSE 
350 companies should be externally 
facilitated at least every three years.13 
The recommended standard of triennial 
external board evaluation is a fairly 
signifi cant development in the area of 
board evaluation likely to reverberate 
more widely. Our research found that 
most large Australian companies conduct 
some sort of evaluation annually but they 
do not necessarily use the same process 
each year. It is becoming quite common 
for companies to alternate the procedure 
used such that they carry out an internal 
assessment one year and use an external 
consultant the next. Certainly most large 
Australian companies would not struggle 
to meet the UK’s recommendation of 
external evaluation every three years, as 
many already use independent consultants 
at least this often. 
In an ideal situation, the type of board 
evaluation chosen ought to refl ect the 
issues facing the company at the time. 
How long the board evaluation 
takes depends on where the board 
is at: if there has been a signifi cant 
changeover, up to half the people 
are relatively new, then you would 
adopt a different approach to an 
experienced board. You need to 
balance the approach with the 
longevity of the board — using a 
prospective evaluation if it is a new 
board, or a retrospective evaluation if 
it is an experienced board. The centre 
of gravity shifts depending on the 
longevity of the board.
Thus, as with all corporate governance 
processes, a performance evaluation 
process needs to be fl exible and should 
be adapted to fi t the company’s changing 
circumstances. The general opinion is 
that the use of an experienced external 
consultant can be very valuable but may 
not be justifi ed every year. External reviews 
are costly but may be particularly useful 
when the board is going through change.
The new UK Code emphasises the need 
to follow the spirit, not only the letter of 
the Code. In a novel attempt to overcome 
the problem of ‘boilerplate’ statements, 
chairmen are encouraged to report 
personally on how they have implemented 
the principles on the role and effectiveness 
of the board. 
Another major change introduced in 
the UK is a requirement for directors of 
FTSE 350 companies to be re-elected 
every year. This may affect processes for 
individual performance evaluation of 
directors. Interestingly, our research found 
that directors were divided on the issue 
of whether board evaluation ought to 
include assessments of individual directors’ 
performance. It seems that despite the 
ASX recommendation to assess directors 
individually, many companies do not 
do this on the basis that it can inhibit 
independence or whole-board dynamics.
These people are elected and are 
meant to be independent. I think it is 
very important that there is respect for 
their independence so I don’t engage 
in personal evaluations. I encourage 
them to be as different as they want 
to be, not push them to the average 
or the middle.
At [company] it is clear that board 
evaluations are about the board, not 
individual directors. You can have the 
best people on the board, but it does 
not work. Or potentially you could 
have the worst people on the board 
and it works. The board is a team of 
rowers, or football players. We need 
to become the best team, to listen, to 
discuss and make decisions.
Disclosure regarding board 
evaluation
The practice of conducting board 
evaluations has developed over the last 
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shall lead the Board through an annual 
self-evaluation process to determine 
whether it and its Committees are 
functioning effectively.17
In the principles-based jurisdictions 
including the UK, Australia and Europe 
there is the opportunity for richer 
disclosure although a common format is 
still apparent with only a few companies 
voluntarily offering more (or different) 
information. Of the 30 Australian 
companies reviewed only three gave 
information describing the valuable 
outcomes of their board evaluation 
process. For example, Santos stated:
As a result of recommendations 
arising from the external Board review, 
a number of initiatives have been 
introduced; for example, increasing time 
spent on strategic issues and improving 
the style and format of Board papers.18
Most companies limited their statements 
to a confi rmation of the occurrence of 
the evaluation and a short description of 
the process used. Some went into more 
detail than others on the process by giving 
details of the topics covered, for example 
Macquarie Bank stated:
The questionnaire will be agreed by the 
Board and covers matters such as:
• the Board’s contribution to developing 
strategy and policy;
• the Board’s performance relative to its 
objectives;
• interaction between the Board and 
management and between Board 
members;
• the Board’s processes to monitor 
business performance and 
compliance, control risks and evaluate 
management; 
• Board composition and structure; and 
• the operation of the Board, including 
the conduct of Board meetings and 
group behaviours.19
In voluntarily giving this additional 
detail, companies can at least give 
investors an indication of the areas where 
improvements might occur. We found 
that most UK companies gave this kind 
ten years, partly due to encouragement 
by regulatory authorities and stock 
exchanges worldwide, most of which 
now recommend that listed companies 
conduct regular performance assessments 
of their boards and also, in some cases, of 
each individual director. In addition, most 
exchanges require companies to disclose 
the details of their board evaluation 
processes in their annual report. The ASX 
Corporate Governance Council’s guidelines 
state ‘companies should disclose the 
process for evaluating the performance of 
the board, its committees and individual 
directors’.14 
The guidelines also recommend that 
‘development of a process for evaluation 
of the performance of the board, its 
committees and directors’ should be a 
responsibility of the nomination committee 
because:
An evaluation of the range of skills, 
experience and expertise on the 
board is important when considering 
new candidates for nomination or 
appointment. Such an evaluation 
enables identifi cation of the particular 
skills that will best increase board 
effectiveness. 15 
The guidelines recommend that reporting 
on board evaluation should include 
whether a performance evaluation for the 
board, its committees and directors has 
taken place in the reporting period and 
whether it was in accordance with the 
process disclosed.16 
Comparisons on board evaluation
From an international comparative 
perspective, the fi rst stage of our research 
revealed that disclosure on board 
evaluation is strongly infl uenced by the 
regulatory approach of each country. In 
the United States where a rules-based 
approach to regulation is prevalent, 
disclosure appears to be much more 
standardised and perfunctory. For example 
AT&T simply stated:
Through a formal survey or other 
appropriate means, the Corporate 
Governance and Nominating Committee 
of detail on the content of the process 
and went on to confi rm that the result 
of the evaluation was that the board 
was found to be performing effectively. 
This audit approach, particularly when 
involving an external evaluation, may give 
some comfort to investors but doesn’t 
give a great deal of fl avor in terms of the 
practical outcomes. The issue of how to 
provide more meaningful disclosure was 
discussed with both directors and fund 
managers in stage two of the research. 
Directors confi rmed that Australian 
companies tend to disclose the minimum 
recommended by the ASX Corporate 
Council guidelines unless they need 
to explain or justify a departure from 
recommended practice. Disclosure in this 
area can be diffi cult due to the potentially 
sensitive and/or confi dential nature of 
performance assessments. There is a 
fear that the market could misinterpret 
information in an adverse way when it was 
intended to convey positive outcomes. 
For example if a company declared that 
as an outcome of the board review it had 
determined that the board should focus 
more on corporate strategy, this could 
be interpreted by the market as ‘the 
board has lost its way!’ An interesting 
point made was that if investors were 
to be told more about the outcomes of 
board evaluation this would be too late 
for investors to act, since any notable 
weakness identifi ed would be addressed 
by the board as a matter of some urgency. 
However investors are concerned that 
at least they know the processes that 
are taking place on boards. Overall, 
some directors were open to the 
concept of increased reporting on board 
evaluation including providing more 
detail on non-sensitive outcomes. Others 
were of the view that this was of little 
value in assessing board performance 
and, interestingly, the fund managers 
interviewed agreed. It seems that the 
institutional investors place little value 
on annual report disclosures preferring 
to assess board members based on their 
backgrounds and personal characteristics.
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Outside, looking in
When asked how investors or other 
outsiders might assess whether a board 
was performing effectively several directors 
believed this to be a ‘mission impossible’. 
All directors and fund managers 
understood that the link between board 
performance and company performance is 
complex and that even the best of boards 
can be hindered by factors beyond their 
control. Nevertheless indicators that can 
be helpful in assessing board performance 
include:
• willingness of a company to seek and 
respond to market feedback
• personal characteristics and credibility of 
directors
• professional history of directors
• company performance within the 
industry
• quality of board decisions, particularly in 
times of crisis.
For the fund managers, assessment of 
board performance is used selectively in 
investment decisions. While there is a 
broad perception of the relative quality of 
boards, and of their relative performance, 
it is generally not seen as a vital factor 
in investment decision-making because 
of the diffi culty in obtaining information 
and ambiguity regarding its link to 
company performance. However, it can be 
valuable in ‘screening’ out boards that are 
perceived negatively. 
This area is not sophisticated enough 
that it drives our portfolios. There is 
not a single company where I could 
say we own it because it has got a 
great board. Having said that, there 
are some we would simply not own 
because their board and management 
are particularly poor.
The UK’s Walker review strongly 
recommended regular board evaluations 
and better disclosure to investors regarding 
such evaluation.
The evaluation statement on board 
performance and governance should 
confi rm that a rigorous evaluation 
process has been undertaken and 
describe the process for identifying the 
skills and experience required to address 
and challenge adequately key risks and 
decisions that confront, or may confront, 
the board. The statement should provide 
such meaningful, high-level information 
as the board considers necessary to assist 
shareholders’ understanding of the main 
features of the process, including an 
indication of the extent to which issues 
raised in the course of the evaluation 
have been addressed. It should also 
provide an indication of the nature and 
extent of communication with major 
shareholders and confi rmation that the 
board were fully appraised of views 
indicated by shareholders in the course of 
such dialogue.20 
Conclusions
Sonnenfeld argues that it’s not the rules 
and regulations but the way people work 
together on boards that make them 
great.21 This is echoed by Daily and Dalton 
who state that board effectiveness is a 
matter of integrity.
The performance of any board is 
a function of the character of the 
individuals that comprise the board. 
No structural remedy can overcome 
poor judgment or apathy. At the same 
time, no amount of individual character 
can overcome accountability without 
responsibility.22
That summarises the diffi culty in assessing 
board effectiveness. A good board 
undoubtedly requires members with specifi c 
skills and experience, and its performance 
will almost always be assisted by good 
structure and process. However, the crucial 
ingredient is the quality of human interaction 
and this is much harder for an outsider, 
especially investors, to know and measure. 
This is where board evaluation ought to 
have real value. Only the board itself can 
really assess its ability to work together, to 
make decisions effi ciently and to identify 
any problems. As Sonnenfeld observes, a 
lack of evaluation and feedback can be 
‘self-destructive’. 
People and organizations cannot learn 
without feedback. No matter how good 
a board is, it’s bound to get better if it’s 
reviewed intelligently… If a board is to 
truly fulfi l its mission, it must become 
a robust team — one whose members 
know how to ferret out the truth, 
challenge one another, and even have a 
good fi ght now and then.23 
Our recent research confi rms the value of 
board evaluation and the fact that, if done 
well, it can contribute greatly to effective 
board performance. It seems that directors 
of large corporations are much more 
willing to engage in board evaluation than 
they might have been some years ago 
and recognise its value, especially in times 
of change. Regulators around the world 
also recognise this, and stock exchange 
recommendations regarding board 
evaluation are becoming more stringent 
post-GFC.
Outcomes of board evaluation processes 
range from relatively minor amendments 
to board processes (such as meeting 
agendas, format of board papers) through 
alteration of committee structures 
(amalgamation or changes to committee 
charters), to signifi cant changes in board 
orientation (for example, spending a good 
deal more time on strategic direction 
of the company and less on procedural 
rituals), to signifi cant changes in board 
composition (to fi ll skill gaps or remove 
directors contributing to dysfunction). The 
process of implementing these outcomes 
of board evaluation is a crucial step that 
perhaps deserves more attention. It is 
a vital component in whether a board 
evaluation process actually leads to better 
There is still reluctance among 
directors to adopt greater 
disclosure of board evaluation 
outcomes, because of the risk 
of issuing sensitive information, 
or in trying to avoid this, issuing 
only valueless motherhood 
statements. 
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board performance. Equally, the links 
between the process of board evaluation 
and other processes such as director re-
election, succession planning and director 
education and development are becoming 
clearer and more formalised in practice 
and these ought to have a tangible impact 
on overall board performance.
An important point that emerged in 
the research interviews was that the 
formal annual board evaluation is not 
the only opportunity for boards to assess 
themselves and implement improvements. 
In a good board, evaluation is a continuous 
process — problems are ironed out as and 
when they are recognised. Many board 
members fi nd that board effectiveness can 
be greatly enhanced if the board members, 
particularly non-executives, have a chance 
to get together outside of formal board 
meetings to discuss issues that might not 
fall within the formal agenda.
There is still reluctance among board 
directors to adopt greater disclosure of 
board evaluation outcomes, because 
of the risk of issuing market sensitive 
information, or, in trying to avoid this, 
issuing only valueless motherhood 
statements. There remains a clear 
preference towards more informal and 
direct communication between board 
members and investors. 
Nevertheless, it is not impossible for fi rms 
to make balanced statements that are 
neither open to misinterpretation by the 
market nor descend into vacuous vanilla 
statements. At the very least investors have 
the right to know that a rigorous process 
of board evaluation has taken place and 
that the outcomes have been acted upon 
in effective ways to enhance the board’s 
performance. It will be interesting to see 
how the UK move to encourage chairmen 
to write personal statements about board 
performance in annual reports works 
out in practice. It is important that the 
widespread practice of chairmen issuing 
standardised statements that appear to 
have been written by the public relations 
department of the company cease. 
Presenting empty rhetoric to investors is 
not appreciated, and does not convey any 
sense of vibrancy in corporate governance.
Following the fi nancial crisis, the economic 
chaos resulting from inadequate board 
oversight has demonstrated the need for 
greater vigilance to ensure companies 
accountability. This is refl ected in recent 
legislative and policy changes, particularly 
in the UK, which acknowledge the 
growing expectation that boards should 
monitor management as well as take full 
responsibility for the monitoring of their 
own performance. Investors, regulators 
and the general public will be interested 
to discover how well boards of directors 
improve their game.
Alice Klettner can be contacted on 
(02) 9514 3080 or by email at 
Alice.Klettner@uts.edu.au. Thomas Clarke 
can be contacted on (02) 9514 3479 or by 
email at Thomas.Clarke@uts.edu.au. 
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